This paper studies a dynamic model of a nancial market with a strategic trader. In each period the strategic trader receives a privately observed endowment in the stock. He trades with competitive market makers to share risk. Noise traders are present i n the market. After receiving a stock e n d o wment, the strategic trader is shown to reduce his risk exposure either by selling at a decreasing rate over time, or by selling and then buying back some of the shares sold. When the time between trades is small, the strategic trader reveals the information regarding his endowment v ery quickly.
If most large trades were motivated by information, large traders would signi cantly outperform the market. However, many empirical studies show that large traders do not signi cantly outperform, and may even underperform, the market. Moerover, this performance is in spite of high portfolio turnover. 5 Therefore, allocational motives must be important.
The dynamic strategies of large traders with allocational motives have received comparatively less attention. The problem has some similarities with the case of informational motives. For instance, a large trader who wants to sell in order to hedge a risky position, has private information that he will sell and that the price will fall. This is similar to an insider who has private information that the price will fall because of a negative earnings announcement. The crucial di erence, however, is that the time of the earnings announcement is exogenous, while the time at which the large trader sells is endogenous. Therefore, the large trader's speed of trade execution cannot be deduced from the insider's, since the latter depends crucially on the time of the earnings announcement. Notice that in the presence of allocational motives, the speed of trade execution determines two important aspects of the trading process. First, the speed of price adjustment, as in the presence of informational motives, and second, the allocative e ciency. If, for instance, the large trader sells slowly, optimal risk-sharing is slowly achieved, and the trading process is not very e cient.
In this paper we study the dynamic strategy of a large trader who trades to share risk. 6 We consider a discrete-time, in nite-horizon, stationary economy with a consumption good and two investment opportunities. The rst is a riskless bondand the second is a risky stock t h a t p a ys a random dividend in each period. The large trader is risk-averse and trades with competitive market makers. We introduce a risk-sharing motive through a privately observed stock endowment that the large trader receives in each period. 7 For simplicity, w e eliminate informational motives by assuming that dividend information is public. To obtain the price impact in the absence of informational motives, we assume that market makers are risk-averse. 8 In addition to the large trader and the market makers, small \noise" traders are present in the market. Since the large trader has a risk-sharing motive, trade can take place even without noise. We i n troduce noise because it is realistic to assume that the large trader can conceal his trades to some extent.
Our model is similar to Kyle (1985) in that a large trader trades with competitive m a r k et makers and noise traders. The main di erences between the two models are the following. First, in Kyle's model the large trader trades to exploit private information about asset payo s. By contrast, in our model, information about asset payo s is public and the large trader trades to share risk. Second, in Kyle's model the large trader and the market makers are risk-neutral, while in our model they are risk-averse. We assume risk aversion so that there is scope for risk-sharing. Third, Kyle's model is non-stationary, since the large trader receives private information only at the beginning of the trading session. By contrast, our model is stationary, since the large trader receives a stock endowment in each period. We assume stationarity so that the model is tractable even when traders are risk-averse.
Our main results concern the dynamics of stock holdings and prices. We show that after an endowment shock, the large trader's stock holdings converge to a long-run limit, determined by optimal risk-sharing between the large trader and the market makers. Moreover, there are two patterns of convergence to the long-run limit: stock holdings can either decrease over time, or they can decrease and then increase.
The rst convergence pattern is very intuitive. Stock holdings decrease over time as the large trader sells to the market makers the fraction of his endowment corresponding to optimal risk-sharing. We show that the rst convergence pattern also has the following properties. First, the trading rate, de ned as trade size (of the large trader's trades) over the size of subsequent trades, decreases over time. In particular, trade size decreases over time. Second, the price impact, de ned as price change over trade size, decreases over time. The trading rate decreases over time as the information regarding the large trader's endowment gets re ected in the price. When the information is not re ected in the price, the large trader has an incentive to sell quickly in order to \frontrun" on this information. The second convergence pattern is somewhat surprising. The large trader sells to the market makers the fraction of his endowment corresponding to optimal risk-sharing. He then engages in a \round-trip transaction", selling some shares only to buy them back later. This pattern occurswhen there is enough noise, and when the large trader is not very risk-averse relative t o t h e market makers. The large trader engages in the round-trip transaction because the market makers misinterpret the sale prior to that transaction, i.e. the sale that led to optimal risk-sharing. Indeed, the market makers attribute the sale to the small traders, who account for most order ow, and expect the large trader to absorb a fraction of the sale. The large trader knows that he initiated the sale and that he will not absorb back a fraction. Therefore, he has private information that the price will fall. He can trade on that information, selling some shares and buying them back when the price falls. The second convergence pattern suggests that large traders' strategies can be complicated and reminiscent of \market manipulation".
The dynamics of stock holdings and prices take a v ery simple form in the \continuous-time" case, where the time between trades, h, is small. They consist of two phases: a rst short phase, whose length goes to 0 when h goes to 0, and a second long phase. In the rst phase, the large trader sells a fraction of his endowment (bounded away from 0) and the information regarding the endowment gets fully re ected in the price. In the second phase, optimal risk-sharing is achieved. The trading rate is thus very high in the rst phase and lower in the second phase. An important property of the dynamics for small h, is that the large trader reveals his information \quickly", i.e. within a time that goes to 0 when h goes to 0. This is in contrast to the slow r e v elation of information in Kyle's (1985) model.
9
The dynamics of stock holdings and prices depend on the noise and on traders' risk aversion. We show that, as the noise increases, the large trader sells faster. However, the market makers' and the large trader's risk aversion have an ambiguous e ect on the speed of trade.
Our results have several empirical implications. In Section VI we derive these implications, and relate our results to the empirical literature on large trades. Moreover, in Section VII we calibrate the model and study how quickly the large trader trades for realistic parameter values.
There is a small literature on the dynamic behavior of large traders with allocational motives. Admati and P eiderer (1988) and Foster and Vishwanathan (1990) allow large traders to optimize the timing of a single trade. They study whether such timing decisions can explain the daily and weekly behavior of returns, volume, and bid-ask spreads. Seppi (1990) compares the upstairs market, where large traders execute their trades as single blocks, to the downstairs market, where they can trade over time. He derives conditions under which large traders with allocational motives prefer the upstairs market. Almgren and Chriss (1999) and Bertsimas and Lo (1998) study the dynamic strategies of large traders who have a xed time horizon to complete a trade and face an exogenous price reaction function. Vayanos (1999) studies the dynamic strategies of large traders who trade to share risk. The main di erence with this paper is that there is no noise. The no noise assumption is somewhat unrealistic, since it implies that large traders cannot conceal their trades. In this paper we make the more realistic assumption that there is noise and show that in its presence, large traders' strategies are very di erent. Indeed, in Vayanos (1999) large traders' stock holdings decrease after an endowment shock and the trading rate is constant. By contrast, in this paper stock holdings either decrease, in which case the trading rate also decreases, or they decrease and then increase. Cao and Lyons (1999) study the dynamic strategies of large dealers who share risk in an inter-dealer market. The main di erences with this paper is that there is no noise and that dealers can trade only for two periods.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section I we p r e s e n t the model. In Section II we determine a Nash equilibrium of the game between the market makers and the large trader. In Section III we study the dynamics of stock holdings and prices after the large trader receives an endowment shock, and in Section IV we study the dynamics in the continuous-time case. In Section V we examine how the dynamics depend on the noise and on traders' risk aversion. In Section VI we derive the empirical implications of our results, and in Section VII we calibrate the model. Finally, in Section VIII we conclude. All proofs are in the Appendix. 
I. The Model
and assume that the dividend shocks `a re independent o f e a c h other and are normal with mean 0 and variance 2 h. All traders learn `i n period`, i.e. dividend information is public.
There are three types of traders: a large trader, market makers, and small \noise"
traders. The large trader is in nitely-lived and consumes c`h in period`.
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His utility over consumption is exponential with coe cient of absolute risk aversion (CARA) and discount r a t e , i.e. In period`the large trader receives an endowment o f `s hares of the stock a n d
;d`h 1 ; e ;rh ù nits of the consumption good. The consumption good endowment is the negative of the present v alue of expected dividends, d`h=(1 ; e ;rh ), times the stock e n d o wment, `.
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The stock endowments `a re independent of each other and of the dividend shocks, and are normal with mean 0 and variance 2 e h. They are private information to the large trader.
Market makers are in nitely-lived and form a continuum with measure 1. A market maker consumes c`h inperiod`. His utility o ver consumption is exponential with CARA and discount rate , i.e.
;h 1 X =`0 exp(; c`; (`;`0)h):
The assumption that market makers form a continuum with measure 1 means the following. First, a market maker maximizes equation (3) taking price as given. Market makers are thus competitive. Second, the market makers' aggregate demand is derived by assigning each market maker an index m in 0 1] and integrating market makers' demands over m.
Aggregate demand is thus the average of market makers' demands. The same is true for the market makers' aggregate stock holdings, endowment, etc.
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Small traders' behavior is not derived from utility maximization. Small traders simply sell u`shares in period`. (Small traders buy if u`is negative.) The sell orders u`are independent of each other, of the dividend shocks, and of the large trader's endowments. They are normal with mean 0 and variance 2 u h.
The sequence of events in period`is as follows. First, the large trader receives his endowments. Second, the market makers and the large trader learn the dividend shock. Third, trade in the stock takes place. Fourth, the stock pays the dividend and fth, the market makers and the large trader consume. Trade is organized as follows. The large trader and the small traders submit market orders and, simultaneously, the market makers submit demand functions. The market-clearing price is then determined and all trades take place at this price.
II. Equilibrium Determination
In this section we determine a stationary Nash equilibrium of the game between the market makers and the large trader. (A Nash equilibrium is stationary if traders' equilibrium strategies are independent of time, holding the state variables constant.) In Section II.A we conjecture traders' equilibrium strategies. These strategies form a Nash equilibrium if it is optimal for a trader to follow his strategy when other traders follow theirs. In Sections II.B and II.C we study traders' optimization problems, and show that determining a stationary Nash equilibrium reduces to solving a system of non-linear equations. In Section II.Dwe solve the system for small order ow. We also derive an equation that we use in Sections III and IV to explain the intuition behind our results.
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A. Strategies
We rst introduce some notation. We denote by e`the large trader's stock holdings after trade in period`, and by s`the market makers' expectation of e`, conditional on information available after trade in period`. We divide the large trader's stock holdings before trade in period`, e`; 1 + `, into expected stock holdings, de ned as the market makers' expectation, s`; 1 , and into unexpected stock holdings. We denote by e`the market makers' aggregate stock holdings after trade at period`. When all market makers follow their equilibrium strategy, e`are also the stock holdings of each market maker. To study the market makers' optimization problem, we will allow a market maker to deviate from his equilibrium strategy, but assume that the other market makers follow t h e i r s . Since market makers form a continuum, the stock holdings of each non deviating market maker will be e`. We will denote the stock holdings of the deviating market maker by e`+ e`.
The conjectured period`equilibrium sell order for the large trader is x`= a e (e`; 1 + `; s`; 1 ) + a s s`; 1 ; a e e`; 1 : (4) (If x`is negative, it is a buy order.) The sell order, x`, is linear in the large trader's unexpected stock holdings, e`; 1 + `; s`; 1 , the large trader's expected stock holdings, s`; 1 , and the market makers' stock holdings, e`; 1 , all evaluated before trade inperiod`. 14 We expect the coe cients a e , a s , a n d a e tobepositive, i.e. the large trader sells when his stock holdings are high and the market makers' stock holdings are low. We allow a e and a s to be di erent, i.e. the large trader can sell at di erent rates out of unexpected and expected stock holdings. We will show that the coe cients a e , a s , and a e are indeed positive and a e > a s .
The conjectured period`equilibrium demand for a market maker is x`(p`) = 
Demand, x`(p`), is linear in the dividend rate, d`, the price, p`, the market makers' stock holdings before trade in period`, e`; 1 , and the market makers' expectation of the large trader's stock holdings before trade in period`, s`; 1 . Notice that a unit increase in the dividend rate leaves demand una ected only if the price increases by h=(1 ; e ;rh ). This is because h=(1 ; e ;rh ) is equal to the increase in the present v alue of expected dividends.
Notice also that traders' conjectured strategies are stationary, since the coe cients a e , a s , a e , A e , A s , and B, are independent o f.
The price in period`is given by the market-clearing condition
Using equation (5) 
B. The Market Makers' Optimization Problem A market maker maximizes the expectation of equation (3) Since market makers form a continuum, the price p`in the budget constraint is given by equation (7), which assumes that all market makers follow their equilibrium strategy. Given that the large trader also follows his equilibrium strategy, equation (7) e`+ e`= e`; 1 + e`; 1 + x`(p`):
The market maker's stock holdings after trade in period`are equal to his stock holdings after trade in period`;1, plus the shares that he buys in period`. Similarly, the dynamics of e`are given by e`= e`; 1 + x`+ u`:
The other market makers' stock holdings after trade in period`are equal to their stock holdings after trade in period`; 1, plus the order ow in period`. Given that the large trader follows his equilibrium strategy, equation (10) 
We nally determine the dynamics of s`, the market makers' expectation of the large trader's stock holdings e`. To determine these dynamics, we rst determine the dynamics of e`and then use recursive ltering. The dynamics of e`are given by e`= ( e`; 1 + `) ; x`: (12) The large trader's stock holdings after trade in period`are equal to his stock holdings after trade in period`; 1, plus his stock endowment in period`, minus his sell order in period . Given that the large trader follows his equilibrium strategy, equation (12) 
The price p`in the budget constraint is given by e q u a t i o n ( 7 ) . The dynamics of d`, e`, s`, and e`are given by equations (1), (12), (15), and (10), respectively.
We conjecture that the large trader's value function is
where Q is a symmetric 3 3 matrix and q a constant. In Proposition 2 (in the Appendix) we provide su cient conditions for the market order in equation (4) to solve the large trader's optimization problem, and for the function (20) to bethe value function. The conditions are on the coe cients A e , A s , B, a e , a s , a e , Q, and q. We explore the economic intuition behind these conditions in the next section.
D. Equilibrium for Small Order Flow
The optimization problems of Sections II.B and II.C produce a set of su cient conditions for traders' strategies to form a stationary Nash equilibrium. The conditions are on A e , A s , B, a e , a s , and a e , the coe cients of traders' strategies, and Q, q, Q, and q, the coe cients of traders' value functions. In the Appendix we combine these conditions with equations (14) and (16) of the market makers' recursive ltering problem, and obtain a system, (S), of 20 non-linear equations. The 20 unknowns are the six coe cients A e , A s , B, a e , a s , a n d a e , the 12 elements of the symmetric 3 3 matrices Q and Q, and the two coe cients g and 2 e . In general, the system (S) is complicated and can only besolved numerically. This is because traders face both \fundamental" risk (dividend risk) and \price" risk (risk coming from the e ect of the other traders on price). The large trader, for instance, faces the risk of a negative dividend shock and the risk of selling at the same time as the small traders. The cost of bearing dividend risk is exogenous and easy to compute. However, the cost of bearing price risk depends on traders' strategies and is a non-linear function of A e , A s , B, a e , a s , a e , Q, a n d Q.
Since dealing with dividend risk is easy and with price risk di cult, it is natural to study the case where price risk is small. The large trader's problem does not change qualitatively for small price risk. Indeed, the determinants of the large trader's strategy are price impact and the risk of holding a large position. Neither goes to 0 as price risk gets small, since there is dividend risk.
Price risk is small when order ow is small, i.e. when the variances 
The coe cient a e is given by a e ; a s = 0 :
The coe cients A e , A s , B, Q, and Q, a r e determined (in the Appendix) by solving systems of linear equations.
When the variance 2 e of the endowment shocks is zero, we can simplify the system (S) and explore the economic intuition behind its equations. We do not consider all the equations of (S), but only two equations that we can derive b y combining the equations of (S). (We derive t h e two equations in the Appendix.) The rst, \market maker" equation follows by combining the equations coming out of the market makers' optimization problem. The second, \large trader" equation similarly follows from the large trader's problem. Combining the market maker and large trader equations, we can obtain an equation that we use in Sections III and IV to explain the intuition behind our results.
The 
Equation (26) states that a market maker's marginal bene t of buying x shares in period and selling them in period`+ 1 , i s 0 . The marginal bene t is the sum of four terms. The rst term represents the price p`that the market maker pays at period`. The second term represents the dividend d`h that the market maker receives in period`. The third term represents an \inventory" cost that the market maker bears by holding a riskier position between periods`and`+ 1 . This inventory cost is proportional to the dividend risk 2 , the market maker's CARA , and the market maker's stock holdings e`. Finally, the fourth term represents the price that the market maker expects to receive in period`+1, discounted in period`. (We denote by E`the expectation w.r.t. the market makers' information, to distinguish it from the expectation w.r.t. the large trader's information.)
The (1 ; a s (1 + g))`0 ;`;2 E`x`0e ;(`0;`)rh = 0 : (27) Equation (27) states that the large trader's marginal bene t of buying x shares in period and selling them in period`+ 1 , is 0. It is the counterpart of equation (26) which sets the marginal bene t of a market maker to 0. The large trader's marginal bene t is the sum of six terms. The rst four terms are as for the market maker. The fth and sixth terms represent the impact of buying and selling shares on prices. The fth term represents the impact on the period`price. It is the product of x`, the numberofshares that the large trader sells in equilibrium, times 1=B, the \marginal" price increase that corresponds to the purchase of x shares. (Equation (7) implies that a purchase of x shares increases the price by ( 1 =B) x.) The sixth term represents the impact on the price in periods`0 `+ 1 . For each`0, w e m ultiply E`x`0, the expected number of shares that the large trader sells in equilibrium, by ;(ga s ; a e )(1 + g) A s ; a s B (1 ; a s (1 + g))`0 ;`;2 (28) the marginal price increase that corresponds to the purchase of x shares in period`and the sale of x shares in period`+ 1 . We then discount in period`, and sum over`0. Equation (28) implies that the purchase and subsequent sale of x shares decreases the price in periods`0 `+ 1 i f ga s ;a e > 0 and increases the price otherwise. We rst explain why this zero cumulative trade a ects prices, and then why the e ect depends on the sign of ga s ; a e . The purchase and subsequent sale of x shares a ects prices because it a ects the market makers' expectation of the large trader's stock holdings. The reason why it a ects the market makers' expectation, is the following. The market makers revise their expectation by comparing order ow to expected order ow. In period`, they compare the purchase of x shares to 0. However, inperiod`+ 1, they compare the sale of x shares not to 0, but to the expectation that the purchase in period`has created. Suppose, for
instance, that after a purchase, the market makers expect a purchase. Then, the sale of x shares will send a stronger signal than the purchase, and the market makers will increase their expectation of the large trader's stock holdings. To determine whether the market makers expect a purchase after a purchase, we use equations (15) and (10). These equations imply that a purchase of x shares in period`reduces s`by g x, e`by x, and expected (sell) order ow in period`+ 1 , a s s`; a e e`, b y ;(a s s`; a e e`) = ( ga s ; a e ) x:
Therefore, the market makers expect a purchase after a purchase if ga s ; a e > 0. Notice that when g is small, i.e. most order ow comes from the small traders, the market makers expect a sale after a purchase. This is because they attribute the purchase to the small traders, and expect the large trader to satisfy part of the demand, i.e. to sell some shares. Combining the market maker equation (26) and the large trader equation (27), we c a n obtain an equation that we use to explain the intuition behind our subsequent results.
Substituting the price p`from equation (26) (1 ; a s (1 + g))`0 ;`;2 E`x`0e ;(`0;`)rh = 0 : (29) The large trader's marginal bene t of buying shares in period`and selling them in period + 1 , can bereduced to a sum of four terms. The rst term is the \risk-sharing" term.
Buying shares bene ts the large trader when his stock holdings e`, adjusted by his CARA , are smaller than the market makers' stock holdings. The second term is the \frontrunning" term. Suppose that in equilibrium the large trader sells in period`+ 1, and that the sale is not expected by the market makers. In period`, the large trader has private information that the price will fall, i.e. E`p`+ 1 ; E`p`+ 1 < 0. By buying shares, he foregoes \frontrun-ning" on this information. The third term is the \price impact" term and represents the impact of buying shares on the period`price. The fourth term represents the impact of buying and selling shares on the price in periods`0 `+ 1 . Since the impact is through the market makers' expectation, we refer to the fourth term as the \belief manipulation" term.
III. Dynamics of Stock Holdings and Prices
In this section we study the dynamics of stock holdings and prices. To study these dynamics, we rst show a result on the coe cients a e and a s of the large trader's equilibrium strategy.
A. The Coe cients a e and a s
The large trader's sell order in period`is given by equation (4) that we reproduce below x`= a e (e`; 1 + `; s`; 1 ) + a s s`; 1 ; a e e`; 1 :
The coe cient a s i s t h e r a t e a t w h i c h the large trader sells out of his expected stock holdings (conditional on the market makers' information) s`; 1 . The coe cient a e is similarly the rate at which the large trader sells out of his unexpected stock holdings e`; 1 + `; s`; 1 . In Proposition 3 we compare the coe cients a e and a s for small order ow. Our numerical solutions con rm Proposition 3 for large order ow. Proposition 3 states that the large trader sells at a higher rate out of unexpected than out of expected stock holdings. To explain the intuition behind this result, we consider two extreme cases. First, the case where the large trader's stock holdings are expected, i.e.
where they are equal to the market makers' expectation s`; 1 . Second, the case where the large trader's stock holdings are unexpected, i.e. where the market makers' expectation is 0. We also suppose that the large trader's stock holdings are high relative to the market makers', so that the large trader sells over time and the price falls. When stock holdings are unexpected, the large trader has private information that the price will fall. By selling slowly, he bears the opportunity cost of not \frontrunning" on this information. By contrast, when stock holdings are expected, the large trader has no private information and bears no such c o s t . Therefore, the large trader sells more slowly when stock holdings are expected. In terms of equation (29), the \frontrunning" term is 0 when stock holdings are expected and negative when they are unexpected. Therefore, the marginal bene t of buying in period and selling in period`+ 1, i.e. the marginal bene t of selling more slowly, is higher when stock holdings are expected.
B. Dynamics
The dynamics of stock holdings and prices are, a priori, complicated, because they are generated by m ultiple endowment and noise shocks. We can, however, simplify the dynamics, using the linearity of the model. Indeed, because of linearity, the dynamics are simply the sum over all shocks of the dynamics generated by e a c h s h o c k. 16 We will study the dynamics generated by an endowment s h o c k. The dynamics generated by a noise shock h a ve a similar avor. We normalize the endowment s h o c k to 1, and assume that it comes inperiod`, i.e. we s e t `= 1 . To isolate the dynamics generated by this shock, we set all other endowment and noise shocks to 0. In Proposition 4 we determine the dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings. 
Proposition 4 implies that stock holdings converge to the long-run limit a e =(a s + a e ), and that convergence takes place at a combination of the rates (1 ; a s ; a e )`0 ;`a nd (1 ; a e (1 + g))`0 ;`. To prove Proposition 4, we determine the joint dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings, e`, the market makers' expectation of the large trader's stock holdings, s`, and the market makers' stock holdings, e`. Equations (13), (17), and (11), give e`, s`, and e`as linear functions of e`; 1 , s`; 1 , and e`; 1 . The 3 3 matrix corresponding to these equations has three eigenvalues. The rst eigenvalue is 1, and corresponds to the long-run limit. The other two e i g e n values are 1 ; a s ; a e and 1 ; a e (1 + g) and correspond
to the rates of convergence.
The dynamics of prices can bededuced from the dynamics of e`, s`, and e`. Equation (8) implies that the price p`is a linear function of e`, s`, and e`. Therefore, the price converges to a long-run limit, and convergence takes place at a combination of the rates (1 ; a s ; a e )`0 ;`a nd (1 ; a e (1 + g))`0 ;`.
We next study the long-run limits of stock holdings and prices, and then the convergence to these limits. The long-run limit of the large trader's stock holdings is a e =(a s + a e ). Since the endowment s h o c k is equal to 1, the long-run limit of the market makers' stock holdings is a s =(a s +a e ). Therefore, in the long run, the endowment shock is divided between the large trader and the market makers according to the ratio a e =a s . This ratio is in fact the optimal risk-sharing rule. Theorem 1 implies that in the absence of price risk, the risk-sharing rule coincides with the standard risk-sharing rule = .
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The long-run limit of the price can be deduced from the long-run limits of stock holdings and the market makers' expectation of the large trader's stock holdings. In the proof of Proposition 4, we show that the latter is a e =(a s +a e ). This means that, in the long run, the market makers form a correct expectation of the large trader's stock holdings. (As all results in this section, this result concerns the dynamics generated by one endowment shock. Because of the subsequent endowment and noise shocks, the market makers never learn the large trader's stock holdings.)
In Proposition 5 we s h o w some results on the convergence of stock holdings and prices to their long-run limits. To state the proposition, we d e n e t wo variables, the trading rate and the price impact. The trading rate is the ratio of the large trader's sell order at a given period,to the sum of his sell orders at that and subsequent periods. The price impact is the ratio of minus the price change at a given period, to the large trader's sell order at that period. Formally, the trading rate in period`0 is x`0= P`0 0 `0 x`00, and the price impact is (p`0 ;1 ; p`0)=x`0.
Proposition 5 If ga s ; a e 0, the large trader's stock holdings decrease over time. The trading rate and the price impact also decrease over time. If ga s ;a e < 0, the large trader's stock holdings decrease and then increase over time.
Proposition 5 implies that there are two patterns of convergence to the long-run limit: the large trader's stock holdings can decrease over time, or they can decrease and then increase. Moreover, when stock holdings decrease over time, the trading rate and the price impact also decrease.
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The rst convergence pattern is very intuitive. Stock holdings decrease over time, as the large trader sells to the market makers the fraction of his endowment corresponding to optimal risk-sharing. The trading rate decreases over time because, rst, the large trader sells at a higher rate out of unexpected than out of expected stock holdings (Proposition 3) and, second, the fraction of stock holdings that are expected increases, as the market makers' expectation becomes more accurate. The price impact decreases over time because the fraction of the large trader's sell order that is unexpected, and that causes the price to change, decreases. Figure 1 illustrates the rst convergence pattern.
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The second convergence pattern is somewhat surprising. The large trader sells to the market makers the fraction of his endowment corresponding to optimal risk-sharing. He then engages in a \round-trip transaction", selling some shares only to buy them back later.
This pattern occurs when g is small, i.e. most order ow comes from the small traders, and when a e =a s is large, i.e. the optimal risk-sharing rule assigns many shares to the large trader. The large trader engages in the round-trip transaction because the market makers misinterpret the sale prior to that transaction, i.e. the sale that led to optimal risk-sharing. Indeed, the market makers attribute the sale to the small traders, who account for most order ow, and expect the large trader to absorb a fraction of the sale. The large trader knows that he initiated the sale and that he will not absorb back a fraction. Therefore, he has private information that the price will fall. He can trade on that information, selling some shares and buying them back when the price falls. Figure 2 illustrates the second convergence pattern.
IV. Dynamics in the Continuous-Time Case
In this section we study the dynamics of stock holdings and prices in the \continuous-time" case, where the time between trades h, is small. We consider the continuous-time case for two reasons. First, because in real-world nancial markets the time between trades can bevery small. Second, because when both the order ow and the time between trades are small, we can determine the Nash equilibrium in closed-form. In Section IV.A we determine the closed-form solution and in Section IV.B we use the solution to study the dynamics of stock holdings and prices.
A. The Closed-Form Solution
We obtain the closed-form solution when both the order ow and the time between trades are small. Proposition 6 implies that for small order ow, a e is of order p h, a s and a e of order h, and g of order 1. Our numerical solutions con rm these results for large order ow.
In Section IV.B we use these results to study the dynamics of stock holdings and prices.
Proposition 6 has also implications on how the coe cients a e , a s , a e , and g depend on the exogenous parameters 2 u , , and , for 2 e = 0 . We explore these implications in Section V, where we perform comparative statics.
The result that a e is of order p h and a s of order h, is stronger than the result a e > a s of Proposition 3. For small h, the large trader sells at a much higher rate, and not simply at a higher rate, out of unexpected than out of expected stock holdings. This result turns out to be crucial for the dynamics of stock holdings and prices, so we explain the intuition behind it in the rest of this section.
We suppose that before trade in period`, the large trader's stock holdings are equal to 1, and the market makers' stock holdings to 0. The large trader thus sells over time. Equation (29) states that the marginal bene t of buying in period`and selling in period + 1, i.e. the marginal bene t of selling more slowly, is the sum of the \risk-sharing" term, the \frontrunning" term, the \price impact" term, and the \belief manipulation" term. The risk-sharing term is negative, since the large trader bears more dividend risk between periods`and`+ 1 . Since the variance of the dividend shock `+1 is 2 h, the risk-sharing term is of order h. The price impact term is positive, since the price in period`increases. It is of the same order as the trade x`, of the large trader. The belief manipulation term can benegative or positive, depending on whether the market makers expect a purchase or a sale after a purchase. For simplicity, we assume that it is 0. When stock holdings are expected, i.e. when s`; 1 = 1 , the frontrunning term is 0. Therefore, the price impact bene t of selling more slowly, has to equal the risk-sharing cost. This means that the trade x`is of order h. Equation (4) implies that x`= a s . Therefore, a s is of order h.
When stock holdings are unexpected, i.e. when s`; 1 = 0, the frontrunning term is negative. This is because the period`price does not re ect the large trader's future sales, and is higher than the period`+ 1 p r i c e . Substituting the price p`+ 1 from equation (7), we can write the frontrunning term as ; 1 B E`x`+ 1 ; E`x`+ 1 e ;rh :
The term in parentheses is the \unexpected" period`+ 1 sell order, i.e. the sell order that can be predicted by the large trader and not by the market makers. The frontrunning term is simply the price impact of the unexpected sell order, discounted in period`. Notice that the price impact term, (1=B)x`, is the \negative" of the frontrunning term, since it is the negative of the price impact of x`, the unexpected period`sell order. The sum of the two terms is of order x`; E`x`+ 1 ; E`x`+ 1 e ;rh :
This, rather than x`, has to beofthe same order as the risk-sharing term, i.e. of order h.
Equations (4), (13), and (17) imply that x`; E`x`+ 1 ; E`x`+ 1 e ;rh = a e ; a e (e`; s`)e ;rh = a e (1 ; (1 ; a e (1 + g))e ;rh ):
Therefore, a e is of order p h.
B. Dynamics
As in Section III.B, we study the dynamics generated by one endowment shock. We rst proceed heuristically. To complement the heuristic analysis, we then study the dynamics in the limit when h goes to 0. In Proposition 6 we showed that a e , the selling rate out stock holdings get close to expected stock holdings. This happens both because total stock holdings decrease, as the large trader sells a fraction of his endowment, and because expected stock holdings increase, as the market makers' expectation becomes more accurate. Once total stock holdings get close to expected stock holdings, they evolve more slowly. Indeed, in Proposition 6 we showed that a s , the selling rate out of expected stock holdings, is of order h. Therefore, expected (and total) stock holdings get close to their long-run limit, within a number of periods of order 1=h, i.e. within a time of order h (1=h) = 1 . The above heuristic analysis implies that for small h, the dynamics consist of two phases.
The rst phase is short, with length of order p h. In this phase, the large trader sells a fraction of his endowment, and the market makers form a correct expectation of the large trader's stock holdings. The second phase is long. In this phase, optimal risk-sharing is achieved. Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings for small h.
To complement the heuristic analysis, we study the dynamics in the limit when h goes to 0. We assume that the endowment shock comes at time t, and we determine the limit when h goes to 0, of the large trader's stock holdings at time t 0 > t . We x times t and t 0 , rather than periods`and`0, because the time between two periods goes to 0 when h goes to 0. We determine the limit of the large trader's stock holdings in Proposition 7.
Proposition 7 The limit when h goes to 0, of the large trader's stock holdings at time t 0 > t is e s + e + g 0 s ; e (1 + g 0 )( s + e ) e ;( s+ e )(t 0 ;t) :
(31) Proposition 7 implies that in the limit when h goes to 0, stock holdings behave a s f o l l o ws. At time t they are equal to 1, the endowment shock. Immediately after time t they drop discontinuously to g 0 =(1+g 0 ). They then converge to the long-run limit e =( s + e ) a t t h e rate e ;( s+ e )(t 0 ;t) . The discontinuous drop corresponds to the rst phase of the dynamics for small h, and the exponential rate of convergence corresponds to the second phase. We should emphasize that the discontinuous drop does not correspond to a single block trade, but to many small trades. Each of these trades is of order p h, and the trades are completed within a time of order p h.
An important property of the dynamics for small h, is that the large trader reveals his information \quickly", i.e. within a time that goes to 0 when h goes to 0. Indeed, the market makers form a correct expectation of the large trader's stock holdings within a time of order p h. The \fast" revelation of information is in contrast to the \slow" revelation of information (within a time that does not go to 0 when h goes to 0) in Kyle's (1985) insider trading model. One reason why the results are di erent may have to do with traders' impatience. Our large trader is risk-averse and bears a cost when holding a risky position. He is thus impatient to reduce his position. By contrast, Kyle's insider is risk-neutral and is not impatient to establish a position, as long as he does so before his information is publicly announced.
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It is, however, unlikely that the di erence in results is due to impatience. Indeed, we get fast revelation of information for all parameter values, including when the risk aversion of the large trader is small.
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A second reason why the results are di erent may have to do with stationarity. Our model is stationary, since the large trader receives a stock endowment in each period. By contrast, Kyle's model is non-stationary, since the insider receives private information only at the beginning of the trading session. Non-stationarity implies that the fast revelation of information cannot be an equilibrium. Indeed, if the insider reveals his information quickly, market depth will increase over time and the insider will prefer to trade more slowly. To determine whether the di erence in results is due to stationarity, one can examine a stationary model with a risk-neutral insider who receives private information over time. Such a model is of independent i n terest. For instance, a result that the insider reveals his information quickly would suggest that markets are informationally e cient even in the presence of informational monopolists.
V. Comparative Statics
In this section we study how the dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings after an endowment shock depend on the exogenous parameters 2 u , , and . The parameter 2 u = 2 u = 2 e is a measure of the relative order ow coming from the small traders and the large trader. We refer to it as noise. The parameters and are the coe cients of absolute risk aversion of the large trader and the market makers. We refer to them as the large trader's and the market makers' risk aversion.
It is easiest to perform the comparative statics for small order ow and time between trades, i.e. for small 2 e and h. Indeed, in the limit when h goes to 0, the dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings simplify to the ones given by Proposition 7. Moreover, for 2 e = 0 , the parameters g 0 , s , and e , are given in closed form by Proposition 6. We perform the comparative statics for small 2 e and h (more precisely, in the limit when Corollary 1 If the noise is small, the large trader's stock holdings decrease over time, while if the noise is large, they decrease and then increase over time. Moreover, as the noise increases, the large trader sells faster.
Corollary 2 If the large trader's risk aversion is large or the market makers' risk aversion small, the large trader's stock holdings decrease over time. In the opposite case, they decrease and then increase over time. Both the large trader's and the market makers' risk aversion have an ambiguous e ect on the speed at which the large trader sells.
To prove the corollaries, we rst note that from Proposition 7 the large trader's stock holdings drop discontinuously from 1 to g 0 =(1+g 0 ), and then converge to the long-run limit e =( s + e ) a t t h e r a t e e ;( s+ e )(t 0 ;t) . We then use Proposition 6 to study how the longrun limit, the discontinuous drop, and the rate of convergence depend on the noise and on traders' risk aversion. Proposition 6 implies that the long-run limit is =( + ). The longrun limit thus decreases in the large trader's risk aversion, increases in the market makers' risk aversion, and is independent of the noise. The intuition is that the long-run limit is determined by optimal risk-sharing. Proposition 6 also implies that the discontinuous drop 1=(1+g 0 ), in the large trader's stock holdings increases in the noise and is independent o f t h e large trader's and the market makers' risk aversion. The intuition is that the discontinuous drop represents the numberof shares the large trader can sell before the market makers form a correct expectation of his stock holdings. This number of shares depends only on the noise. Finally, Proposition 6 implies that the rate of convergence e ;( s+ e )(t 0 ;t) becomes faster (i.e. s + e increases) as the noise increases, the large trader's risk aversion increases, and the market makers' risk aversion decreases.
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The intuition is that the large trader trades quickly if he is impatient to reduce his position and if the price impact is small. The large trader's impatience increases in his risk aversion, and the price impact decreases in the noise and increases in the market makers' risk aversion.
Using the above results, it is straightforward to prove the corollaries. The rst result of Corollary 1 follows by noting that the long-run limit of stock holdings is independent of the noise, while the discontinuous drop increases in the noise. Therefore, stock holdings drop above their long-run limit if the noise is small, and below otherwise. For the second result of the corollary, suppose that the noise is small, in which case stock holdings drop above their long-run limit. As the noise increases, the discontinuous drop increases, and the subsequent rate of convergence to the long-run limit becomesfaster. Therefore, the large trader sells faster. Moreover, as the noise gets large, the large trader sells immediately, since stock holdings drop discontinuously below their long-run limit.
To prove Corollary 2, we note that the large trader's and the market makers' risk aversion have opposite e ects on the long-run limit of stock holdings, the discontinuous drop, and the rate of convergence. Therefore, we can focus on the large trader's risk aversion. The rst result of the corollary follows by noting that the long-run limit of stock holdings increases as decreases, while the discontinuous drop is independent o f . Therefore, stock holdings drop above their long-run limit if is large, and below otherwise. For the second result of the corollary, note that as decreases, the rate of convergence to the long-run limit (that applies subsequent to the discontinuous drop) becomes slower, but the long-run limit increases and becomes easier to reach. In other words, the large trader sells more slowly, but has a smaller quantity to sell. To show that either e ect can dominate, consider three cases: = 1, i.e. in nitely risk-averse large trader, large but not 1, and small. If = 1, the large trader sells immediately, since he bears an in nite cost of holding a risky position. If is large but not 1, the large trader does not sell immediately, since stock holdings drop above their long-run limit and then converge slowly to that limit. Finally, i f is small, the large trader sells immediately, since stock holdings drop below their long-run limit. Figure 4 illustrates the e ects of the noise on the dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings and Figure 5 illustrates the e ects of the large trader's risk aversion. These gures are drawn for general values of 2 e and h, and are consistent with the corollaries.
VI. Empirical Implications
In this section we derive the empirical implications of our results. We also relate our results to the empirical literature on the price impact and the execution of large trades.
We focus on the results concerning the dynamics of stock holdings and prices. These results have implications for time-series data on institutional trades. We should note that the dynamics in our model are generated by multiple endowment and noise shocks. The data are also likely to be generated by multiple shocks, where shocks can, for instance, beinterpreted as changes in institutions' desired portfolios. Indeed, institutions' desired portfolios change frequently, in response to in ows and out ows of funds, changing market conditions, etc. To study the dynamics in our model, we considered the dynamics generated by each shock in isolation. Therefore, one way to bring our model to the data is to lter the data, and produce sequences of trades corresponding to each shock. Our results have empirical implications for these sequences.
In Proposition 5 we show that, after an endowment shock, the large trader's stock holdings can decrease over time, or they can decrease and then increase. Moreover, when stock holdings decrease over time, the trading rate and the price impact also decrease. These results imply that in a sequence of institutional trades, in which all trades are in the same direction, the following should be true. First, trading rate, de ned as trade size over size of subsequent trades, decreases over time. In particular, trade size decreases over time, i.e. the rst trades are the largest. Second, price impact, de ned as price change over trade size, decreases over time.
In Corollaries 1 and 2 we show that stock holdings decrease and then increase, when the noise is large, the large trader not very risk-averse, and the market makers very riskaverse. Therefore, a sequence of institutional trades in which not all trades are in the same direction is more likely to beobserved (i) for stocks with a high ratio of non-institutional to institutional trades, i.e. for stocks where the noise is large, (ii) for large, and thus not very risk-averse, institutions, and (iii) for stocks with few, weakly capitalized, and thus very risk-averse, market makers.
In Corollaries 1 and 2 we s h o w that, as the noise increases, the large trader sells faster. We also show that the large trader's and the market makers' risk aversion have an ambiguous e ect on the speed of trade. Therefore, a sequence of institutional trades should be completed faster for stocks with a high ratio of non-institutional to institutional trades. However, the size of the institution and the number of market makers should have an ambiguous e ect on the length of a trading sequence.
Most empirical studies of large trades, isolate individual trades and measure their price impact. (See, for instance Kraus and Stoll (1972) , Scholes (1972) , Mayers (1987, 1990) , Hausman, Lo, and McKinlay (1992) , Chan and Lakonishok (1993) , and Keim and Madhavan (1996) .) Chan and Lakonishok (1995) recognize that individual trades may bepart of a sequence or, in their terminology, a \package". They show that the price impact of trades is larger when these are analyzed in terms of packages rather than individually. They determine the distribution of package lengths and show that 53 percent of packages take four or more days to becompleted. They also show that, quite surprisingly, packages in small stocks are completed faster than packages in large stocks.
The above relation between package length and stock size, although surprising, is not inconsistent with our results. Indeed, small stocks have few market makers and our results imply that the length of a package does not necessarily increase as the numberof market makers decreases. On the other hand, our results imply a strong negative relation, across stocks, between package length and the ratio of non-institutional to institutional trades. Such a relation is not examined in Chan and Lakonishok (1995) , but can be tested in future research. The other implications of our results concern \ ner" properties of packages, such as how trade size and price impact vary over the course of the package and when all trades in the package are in the same direction. These properties are not examined in Chan and Lakonishok, but can also be tested in future research.
VII. Calibration
In this section we calibrate the model, and study how q u i c kly the large trader trades after receiving an endowment shock. We measure the speed of trade by t h e a verage time of trade execution (ATTE). This is the weighted sum of the times at which trades are executed, with weights equal to the trades divided by the total trade. In Figure 6 we plot the AT T E a s a function of the noise. The parameter = is equal to 1=9. The large trader is thus nine times as risk-averse as the market makers as a group. We assume that the market makers are not very risk-averse to capture the real-world feature that market makers can unload, to outside investors and over time, trades they receive from the large trader. (In our model market makers cannot unload trades since there are no outside investors.) The annual interest rate r is equal to 5 percent. The time between trading periods h is equal to 1=5000'th of a year. Since there are approximately 250 trading days per year, there are (250 h) ;1 = 2 0 trading periodsperday.
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The parameter e =r is equal to 0.1. This parameter determines the ratio of price risk (price variability due to trades) to dividend risk (price variability due to dividends). If e =r = 0 :1, the ratio is approximately 10 percent.
Finally, t h e e n d o wment s h o c k of the large trader is equal to 1. The size of the endowment shock does not a ect the ATTE, because of the linearity of the model. Figure 6 shows that when the noise is greater than four, the ATTE is approximately ve trading days. When the noise is smaller than four, however, the ATTE increases substantially. For instance, when the noise is two, the ATTE is 53 trading days. Such a n ATTE seems somewhat long (although there is anecdotal evidence that it can take a very long time to get out of an extremely large position.) On the other hand, an ATTE of ve trading days seems quite consistent with the ndings of Chan and Lakonishok (1995) .
VIII. Conclusion
This paper studies a dynamic model of a nancial market with a large trader. In each periodthe large trader receives a privately observed endowment in the stock. He trades with competitive market makers to share risk. Small noise traders are present in the market. After receiving a stock endowment, the large trader is shown to reduce his risk exposure either by selling at a decreasing rate over time, or by selling and then buying back some of the shares sold. He follows the second strategy when there is enough noise and when he is not very risk-averse relative to the market makers. When the time between trades is small, the large trader reveals the information regarding his endowment very quickly. Finally, the large trader sells faster as the noise increases, but the market makers' and the large trader's risk aversion have a n a m biguous e ect on the speed of trade. Our results have several empirical implications that can be tested in future research.
Future research can also address some theoretical issues. First, in this paper we obtain analytical results only for small order ow, i.e. only for small endowment and noise shocks. For large order ow, we can only obtain numerical results (which are consistent with the analytical results). Since many institutions need to execute large trades on a frequent basis, it would bedesirable to gain more insight on the equilibrium for large order ow. In the context of our model, this can bedone by studying in more depth the non-linear system (S). Second, in our model, trading needs are \smooth". Indeed, normality implies that the endowment shocks are never equal to 0, and are small when the time between trades is small. However, in the real-world trading needs are frequently \lumpy". Many institutions do not trade for a period of time and then need to execute a large trade. It would be interesting to know whether our results are robust to endowment s h o c ks not being normal.
Finally, it would beinteresting to know why our large trader reveals his information quickly while Kyle's insider reveals his information slowly. In Section IV.B we suggested that this might be because our model is stationary while Kyle's model is not. To determine whether the stationarity is indeed the reason, one can examine a stationary model with a risk-neutral insider who receives private information over time. Such a model is of independent interest. For instance, a result that the insider reveals his information quickly would suggest that markets are informationally e cient even in the presence of informational monopolists. 
We also denote by `t he unexpected order ow (conditional on the market makers' information) i.e. `= a e (e`; 1 + `; s`; 1 ) + u`:
The market maker's optimization problem, (P 
In equation (A9), Q 0 I J denotes the matrix formed by t h e rows of Q 0 whose indices belong to the set I and by the columns whose indices belong to the set J. In equation (A10), Q 0 I denotes the matrix Q 0 I I , and ; is a symmetric 3 3 matrix whose elements are 1 for (i j) = ( 1 1) (1 2) (2 1) (2 2) and 0 otherwise.
Proposition 1 The demand in equation (5) 
We also introduce x`, the di erence between the large trader's market order and the candidate market order, i.e.
x`= x`; (a e (e`; 1 + `; s`; 1 ) + a s s`; 1 ; a e e`; 1 ) :
We will write p`and the dynamics of e`, s`, and e`in terms of x`instead of x`. The large trader's optimization problem, (P where ; is as in equation (A10).
Proposition 2 The market order in equation (4) 
C. The System (S) The system (S) consists of the following equations. First, the three optimality conditions (A11), (A12), (A13), and the six Bellman conditions (A14) of the market makers' optimization problem. Second, the three optimality conditions (A30) and the six Bellman conditions (A32) of the large trader's problem. Finally, t h e t wo equations (14) and (16) e . We also replace equations (16) and (14) by (23) and (24).
D. Proofs of Propositions 4 and 7
Proof of Proposition 4: We rst show that the dynamics are the sum over endowment and noise shocks of the dynamics generated by e a c h s h o c k. We then determine the dynamics generated by a n e n d o wment shock. 
The rst term in equation (A35) corresponds to the dynamics generated by the endowment and noise shocks prior to period m 0 . The second and third terms correspond to the dynamics generated by the shocks between periods m 0 and m 0 .
To isolate the dynamics generated by a unit endowment shock in period`, we use equation ( trader's stock holdings, the dotted line the price, and the thin solid line the long-run limit of stock holdings and price. (Price is normalized so that it has the same initial value and long-run limit as stock holdings.) The large trader's stock holdings decrease over time. The trading rate, which is the ratio of the slope of stock holdings to the di erence between stock holdings and the long-run limit, decreases over time. The price impact, which is the ratio of the slope of price to the slope of stock holdings, also decreases over time. This gure is drawn for the following parameter values. The parameter 2 u = 2 u = 2 e is equal to 2, which means that the small traders produce twice as much order ow as the large trader. The parameter = is equal to 1=9, which means that the large trader is nine times as risk-averse as the market makers as a group. The annual interest rate r, is equal to 5 percent. The time between trading periods h, is equal to 1=5000'th of a year. Since there are approximately 250 trading days per year, our choice of h implies 20 trading periods per day. Finally, t h e parameter e =r is equal to 0.1. This parameter determines the ratio of price risk (price variability due to trades) to dividend risk (price variability due to dividends). Our choice of e =r implies a ratio of approximately 10 percent. trader's stock holdings, the dotted line the price, and the thin solid line the long-run limit of stock holdings and price. The large trader's stock holdings decrease and then increase over time. First, they decrease to their long-run limit. Then, they decrease further, and increase back to their long-run limit, as the large trader engages in a \round-trip transaction". Notice that the round-trip transaction is pro table, since the average price of sales exceeds the average price of purchases. The parameter values for this gure are Figure 3 . The dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings for small time between trades h. The thick solid line represents stock holdings for h 1 , the dotted line stock holdings for h 2 < h 1 , and the thin solid line the long-run limit of stock holdings. The dynamics consist of two phases. In the rst, short phase, stock holdings decrease quickly, while in the second, long phase, they evolve more slowly. Notice that the rst phase is shorter for h 2 than for h 1 . The parameter values for this gure are 2 u = 2 (the small traders produce twice as much order ow as the large trader), = = 1 =9 (the large trader is nine times as risk-averse as the market makers as a group), r = 5 percent, h 1 = 1 =5000 and h 2 = 1 =50000'th of a year (20 or 200 trading periods per day), and e =r = 0 :1. 
Stock Holdings
Risk Aversion 1 Long-Run Limit 1 Risk Aversion 2 < Risk Aversion 1 Long-Run Limit 2 Figure 5 . The e ects of the large trader's risk aversion , on the dynamics of the large trader's stock holdings. The thick solid line represents stock holdings for 1 , the thick dotted line stock holdings for 2 < 1 , the thin solid line the long-run limit of stock holdings for 1 , and the thin dotted line the long-run limit for 2 . As decreases, the long-run limit of stock holdings increases, while the initial drop stays roughly the same. For 2 , stock holdings drop below their long-run limit, and thus decrease and then increase over time. Since for 2 stock holdings drop below their long-run limit, the large trader sells faster for 2 than for 1 . The parameter values for this gure are The assumption that market makers are risk-averse was standard in the early, \ i n ventorybased", market-microstructure literature. For a survey of that literature and for more recent references, see O'Hara (1995) . 9 We explain why the results are di erent in Section IV.B.
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The time between trades h, is smaller than a day. Therefore, a criticism of the utility in equation (2) is that it connects intraday trading decisions and consumption/savings decisions. To address this criticism, we could assume that consumption takes place once every given numberof periods. (Traders are evaluated every quarter.) This assumption would complicate the model but would probably not change the results.
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We i n troduce the consumption good endowment for tractability. In our model, the large trader faces \fundamental" risk (the risk of a negative dividend shock), \price" risk (the risk of selling at the same time as the small traders), and \endowment" risk (the risk of receiving a small stock endowment). The latter risk depends on the large trader's marginal valuation of a share. Therefore, it increases in the dividend level and decreases in the large trader's stock holdings. The large trader can hedge this risk by increasing his stock holdings, i.e. buying shares from the market makers. Moreover, he needs to buy more shares when dividends are high. The consumption good endowment makes the hedging demand independent of the dividend level, thus simplifying the model. Indeed, the consumption good endowment represents a cost that the large trader pays in order to receive the stock endowment. The risk of receiving a small stock endowment is accompanied by the risk of paying a small cost. The speci cation of the consumption good endowment ensures that the sum of the two risks is independent of the dividend level. The model without the consumption good endowment was considered in an earlier version and produces similar results. Moreover, the model with the consumption good endowment is, in a sense, more realistic, since it captures the idea that the stock endowment does not come for \free". If, for instance, the stock endowment is interpreted as a position in a correlated stock, the consumption good endowment captures the cost of establishing the position.
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Notice that the large trader is treated as an \atom", while a market maker is treated as part of a continuum. It is in this sense that the large trader is large, and thus strategic, while a market maker is small (in nitesimal), and thus competitive. Notice also that a continuum of market makers is equivalent to a single competitive m a r k et maker. We assume a c o n tinuum because this clari es the exposition.
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In this paper we determine one stationary Nash equilibrium, and thus show existence of Nash equilibrium. We d o n o t s h o w uniqueness.
14 The large trader's sell order depends on the market makers' expectation s`; 1 , and the market makers' stock holdings e`; 1 . The large trader does not observe these variables directly. However, he can infer them from the prices up to period`; 1. Indeed, equations (7), (10), and (15), imply that s`and e`can beobtained recursively from s`; 1 , e`; 1 , d`, and p`. 15 We thus assume that the variance of e`; 1 conditional on I`; 1 is independent of`. This is a condition for stationarity and is satis ed if and only if Indeed, the regression of e`on x`+ u`implies that the variance of e`conditional on Iì s equal to the RHS of equation (14). Notice that in our stationary equilibrium, 2 e is endogenous since it is given by equation (14) The risk-sharing rule is di erent in the presence of price risk. The large trader, who is subject to endowment s h o c ks, is more reluctant t o t a k e risk than the market makers.
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When stock holdings decrease and then increase over time, the trading rate and the price impact have a complicated behavior, because their denominators can become 0.
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The parameter values for which this and the subsequent gures are drawn are in the gures' legends. For now, we focus on the qualitative aspects of the gures. We discuss the parameter values and the axis markings in Section VII where we calibrate the model. 20 Holden and Subrahmanyam (1994) and Baruch (1999) have shown that risk aversion makes the insider impatient. The insider prefers to establish a position early, before the noise traders introducetoomuch price volatility.
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It is worth noting that for a xed h (i.e. not in the limit when h goes to 0) the large trader reveals his information more slowly when he is less risk-averse. This can be seen from Figure 5 , where the rst phase of the dynamics is longer when the large trader is less risk-averse. However, in the limit when h goes to 0, the large trader reveals his information immediately, independently of his risk aversion. 22 Gennotte and Kyle (1993) and Chau (2000) study in nite-horizon models with insiders. However, Gennotte and Kyle do not report any results on the speed of information revelation, and Chau does not consider the continuous-time case.
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The proof is available from the author upon request. To show that s + e increases in and decreases in , we need to make the plausible assumption that < 2 , i.e. the market makers as a group are less than twice as risk-averse as the large trader. 24 We focus on the e ects of the noise, because it is the parameter that a ects the ATTE the most.
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It is worth emphasizing that h a ects the speed of trade only because it a ects the length of the rst phase. (This length is of order p h.) Indeed, when h decreases, the numberoftrading periods increases, but the quantity traded per period decreases. In the rst phase the rst e ect dominates, because the number of trading periods in a given time interval is of order 1=h, while the quantity traded per period is of order p h. In the second The transversality condition (A6) is standard for optimal consumption-investment problems. See, for instance, Merton (1969) and Wang (1994) .
